

Contribution of Geographic Knowledge in Directing the History Movement: Nazi Living Space Theory as a Paradigm

Hayder Sh. Obaid Alsultani*

Introduction

Human thought and action are one of the most important factors controlling the historical reality of human societies. The human act, within the framework of historical space, is the product of human thoughts and emotions. Geographical knowledge is a central part of the human thought system that controls the course of history, especially those ideas and theories of political geography that dealt with the phenomenon of the state. the Second World War (1939-1945) was the most important event that contributed to the course of contemporary European and global history. Therefore, providing an explanatory model to understand such great events in human history is a vital task of historical study because of its relation to the formation of present and future visions. It is necessary to dismantle the facts of these events and follow the details that helped shape their historical reality, and then to understand the motives that guided the history movement towards major transformations.

The transformations of geographical thought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries had defined the major strategic visions and directions of states, especially for a country like Germany during the interwar period. These cognitive results contributed to the formation of expansion trends in the German mind. The geopolitics logic and the level of its deal with the phenomenon of the state dominated on the thinking of the ruling circles in Germany during the interwar period in a way that led to frenzied attempts to apply it on the ground. This logic was the most important part in directing the compass of geographical expansion and increasing the area of the state in order to provide guarantees of its economic and strategic strength at the international level. All these elements were embodied by "Living Space Theory", which was the most prominent of geopolitics theories, and turned into sacred icon in Nazi mind that determined their attitude of war and peace.

* Assist Prof., University of AL-Mustansiriyah, College of Education, Baghdad/IRAQ,
dr.haidersultani@gmail.com

The research discusses the assumption that the development of geographical knowledge contributed to the formation of Nazi expansionist ambitions, which was reflected in the attempt of the Nazis to obtain a living space for Germany. This endeavor played a major role in determining the Nazi attitude towards that war and the main reason for its outbreak and the make of its history. In the sense that geographical knowledge had its own contribution to changing the course of contemporary political history of Europe and the world, and provided a suitable opportunity to design the foundations of the global system after the war (the World War II). Since the study of such links is one of the basic tasks of historical research, the task of this research paper will try to prove the extent to which this hypothesis matches the historical reality, and its content is a consistent attempt, in its general, to call for a revision of the history of World War II and an attempt to discover Elements that have defined the course of European history, and may in part contribute to providing an explanatory model for one of the causes of that war beyond the framework of traditional interpretations known. So, we will try to answer the following questions: What is the nature of the developments of geographical thought and its cognitive additions that led to these results? What are the levels of influence of this geographical knowledge in the formulation of the theory of Nazi expansionism? What is the framework or geographical field for the applications of that theory? And how this theory, especially its principle of “economic self-sufficiency”, contributed in directing the Nazi mind and the tendency to war as a means to meet the requirements of that economic efficiency?

The research will examine three main topics: The first deals with the historical roots of “living space theory” in Nazi thought and its structure as a factor in the outbreak of war. This theme was designed to discuss the effects of geopolitics and its theories and the ideas of a number of geographers such as Frederick Ratzl (1844-1904), Rudolf Kellen (1864-1922) and Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) and others and their role in the development of geographical knowledge and the consolidation of new concepts founded for the emergence of geopolitics science, which was unique in special treatments of the phenomenon of state, and produced theories of expansion dominated the mind of the German elite in general and the Nazi mind in particular. The second topic will discuss: how the Nazis adopted on the knowledge of geographies that German geographer Karl Haushofer invested it to lay the foundations of the theory of the “Living Space” which adopted by the Nazis and appeared in their political writings and speeches since the mid-1920s. The third and final topic of the research will deal with the two main axes

of the “living Space” theory: the first includes an attempt to determine the target geographic field of the theory. The second was devoted to the discussion of the Nazi economic difficulties to apply the principle of “economic self-sufficiency”. It will also address the attempts to implement this on the ground and the geography of Nazi practice to achieve this goal, with the clarifying some practical reasons that led to insisting on implementing this theory.

Firstly: The Impact of the Development of Geographical Knowledge in German Political Thought

The development of modern geographical knowledge is associated with the climate of racist visions that have been associated with the theories of global hegemony and domination of the European powers since the nineteenth century. At the end of the century German geographer Frederick Ratzel formulated a new branch of geography devoted to the link between the political entity of the state and its geographical environment and how to invest it to achieve its survival and expansion, and called this new branch the name “Political Geography”^{1, 2} It seems that the debate between the geographers on the terms of reference of this new section has produced two prominent trends in the characterization of the function of geopolitics in dealing with the phenomenon of the state, the first one was that the followers of the function of political geography “*describe and infer the strengths and weaknesses [of the state] as they are in the present*”, While the second-generation geographers considered that it should deal with everything that “*represents the conscience, ambition, needs and interests, future of the state, and how to protect and preserve it, which is therefore the key to national politics*”³ The geopolitical content of this trend on the state will be called geopolitical.

In other words, geopolitics treat the state as an evolving dynamic organism, a constantly growing organism. As will be seen this coincided with the influence of geographers on the theory of evolution of Charles Darwin (12 Feb. 1809-19 Apr. 1882) and the Social Darwinism published by Herbert Spencer (27 Apr. 1820 - 8 Dec. 1903), based on the theory of evolution, their perspective is subject to the conditions of the theory of evolution, so the state have two options, either grow

1 The existence of this abbreviation with the source, mean that the source is Arabic book or translated into Arabic

2 For more information, see: *Freidrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie*, München und Leipzig, Verlag von Oldenbourg, 1897.

3 Jassim Sultan, *Geography and the Next Arab Dream: Geopolitics when Speaking Geographically*, Beirut, Tamkeen Research and Publishing House, 2013, p. 16.

and widen or perish and die⁴. This means that the first approach treats the state as static, stable, while geopolitical advocates designed the theoretical frameworks for the growth and expansion of the state by engineering the nature of the “fateful” relationship between the state and the area that includes its needs and requirements, and thus helps in its endeavor and struggle in order to obtain that domain.

The history of the real geopolitical science, with its basic methodologies and determinants, coincided with the late nineteenth century when the professor of geography at Leipzig University Frederick Ratzel presented his ideas in this regard in an article published in 1896 in *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen*, the article discussed the “Laws of Land Growth of States”, in which Ratzel defined the seven laws, which drive countries to expand their borders and search for a broader area to ensure their survival and continuity, and the source of these evolutionary laws in Ratzel’s opinion stems from his belief that the state is an organic organism or a deep rooted biological entity, while at the same time a moral and moral entity derived from Human land link operates and feeds on its sources and needs to be protected and the protection of his life on them. Of these laws and in short:

- 1) The state grows by growing its culture.
- 2) The growth of the state continues until it reaches the annexation stage by adding micro units to it.
- 3) The general tendency of expansion and annexation moves from state to state, and the state, by its growth, seeks to absorb sections of political value⁵.

The other qualitative addition by Ratzel was the publication of his “Political Geography” in 1897, in which he reviewed in depth his main idea: “*The state is an organism that grows and its needs continually increase. The border is like the skin of an organic organism, which must be constantly extended as it grows*”⁶. According to this vision, the state is subject to environmental determinism because it is a living spatial organism whose fate is related to the land space “*der staat als bodenstandiger organismus*”. In order to survive, it must expand this space as its population increases and its ambitions increase, even by force and otherwise they will collapse⁷.

4 Hassan Abdel-Al, “Israeli Geopolitics: The Entrance to the Israeli War Geopolitics”, *Political Thought Magazine*, No. 13-14, 2001, p. 3.

5 Sabah Mahmood Mohamed, “The Idea of the Living Space: Land Expansion in Nazi and Zionist Thought and Practice”, *Afaq Earabiat*, Third Year, Issue 1, March 1978, p. 66-67.

6 Sultan, Op. Cit., p. 69; and see also: Ratzel, Op. Cit., p. 1-9.

7 Ratzel, Op. Cit, p. 1-9.

At the end of the 19th century, Ratzel was influenced by the general scientific atmosphere loaded with all the weight of evolutionary theory in the natural sciences, so he viewed political geography as a branch of the natural sciences, and found the idea of place as an influential element and at the same time influenced by the political characteristics of the group or groups that inhabit the place, but the site is the element that coloring the place makes it always different from other places, and then dye the state in a different color to other countries. Hugo R. F. Hassinger, one of the most important German geographers who opposed the idea of inevitable geography and Ratzel's vision of the state that appeared in his political writings, writes:

"The aim of Ratzel's political geography is to explain and portray the state as a living entity connected to the earth and as a variable device with the movement of history. Thus, the place and location and changes in the political form of the place are, in Ratzel's view, fundamental factors, while the human factor, which is the image of peoples, stands in the background of the picture"⁸.

Ratzel's ideas merged with the climates and atmosphere of Germany's rise and its search for an international position after the achievement of its national unity in 1871. Thus, those who formulated geopolitics invested his contributions in this field and borrowed some of his theories as geopolitical pillars⁹. However, the subsequent important task of this development was by Rudolf Kjellen, the Swedish historian and political scientist, which was influenced by the German culture, who was the first to design the geopolitical term to embody the knowledge of theoretical progress in political geography and designed the boundaries of the geopolitical term, the term was first introduced in an article published in 1899 in the *Swedish Geographical Journal*¹⁰. The term was used again in his 1905 article published in the *Geographische Zeitschrift*, describing the "*role of geographical factors in determining national behavior*"¹¹. The term is repeated in two books published by

8 Quoted in: Mohamed Riyadh, *General Assets in Geopolitical and Geopolitical*, Cairo, Hendawi Foundation for Education and Culture, 2012, p. 48.

9 Whittlesey, Derwent, "Haushofer: The Geopoliticians Scientists of the Earth Policy", *The Pioneers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to Hitler* ed. Edward Mead Earl and others. , trans. Mohamed Abdel Fattah Ibrahim, Alnahdh Almasryah Library, Cairo, p. 29.

10 Michael Heffernan, "Fin De Siecle, Fin Du Monde? On the origins of European Geopolitics, 1890–1920", in: Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (Ed.), *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 27.

11 Bert Chapman, *Geopolitics: A Guide to the issues*, California, Opraeger, 2011, p. 7.

Kjellen, the first in Leipzig in 1917, entitled “The State is a manifestation of life = *Der Staat als Lebensform*”¹² and the second in 1920, entitled “The Foundations for a Political System = *Grundriss Zu einem System der Politik*”, in which he exposed to organic philosophy, and developed his research into what is known as “the theory of the state”¹³.

The German geographers promoted the terminology and opinions of Kjellen, Ratzel and others, and they played a role in spreading these ideas among German political and intellectual elites. On the other hand, German politicians adopted these ideas as an emotional reaction to the plight of their country and its national post-World War I hysteria¹⁴, to save Germany and the restoration of its postwar power¹⁵. Such fevered enthusiasm was expressed by to the revenge for defeat in the war, the correction of the Paris Peace Process of 1919, and the disintegration of the Treaty of Versailles signed by Germany on June 28, 1919, but would Germany’s special circumstances and its plight be enough to explain German geographers’ interest in geopolitics more than others?

In response to the last question, it will be useful to review some of the main features of the German historical context that contributed to the building of the intellectual and philosophical system that strengthened the presence of such ideas and transformed them into a culture that is firmly rooted in the German mentality and more responsive to it. Which made it easier for ruling elites to adopt them and try to apply them on the ground. The geopolitical ideas in Germany were in harmony with the philosophical calls that were combined with a military tendency and a scientific framework, provided by social Darwinism, and the tendency of the narcissistic racism, gave the German preference on the others, and establish, as a result, the feelings of hostility to other peoples and Jews as well, as it gave clear hints about the place that should be the target of the expansion of the German areas of Slavs and Jews in the Eastern European continent.

It can be said with confidence that the geographical determinants of the eastward direction were only a core part of the German intellectual and political heritage.

12 Rudolf Kjellen, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1917, p. 156-202.

13 Riyadh, Op. Cit., p. 67; Chapman, Op. Cit., p. 7.

14 For more details, see: A. C. B. Tyler, *Origins of Second World War*, trans. Mustafa Kamal Khamis, Cairo, Egyptian General Authority for Composition and Publication, 1971; Scheck Raffael, *Germany, 1871–1945 A Concise History*, Oxford, 1st Floor, 2008, p. 111-156.

15 Witlesi, Op. Cit., p. 37.

It is the same path of the Teutons Knights “*Die Ritter Teutons*”, as claimed by the Germans and reflected in their oral and written literature¹⁶. Germans were thinking more geographically than others “*they were more aware of geography*” because their country has historically changed on the map and is located between the sea to the north and the Alps in the south, but the plains located to the west and east were open to both invasion and expansion, so the Germans lived geography with all their feelings, and were more interested in it, which explains why they took care of science and geographical knowledge and its development¹⁷. The historical circumstances necessitated this trend in the Middle Ages, as the Germany eastern states were the bastion against the hordes of strangers from Asia and Europe to the West. Since the time of Frederick I (1152-1190), these states became the spearheads of the German incursion in the east of the continent, which was later dubbed the “Rush to the East = *Drang nach Osten*”¹⁸.

The militarism of the Germans, the precise organization of the army and the development of its military ideology¹⁹, which became more evident since the reign of Frederick William I (1713-1740) by the influence and power exercised by Prussia on the German states²⁰, added momentum to these expansionist ideas and tendencies, which was manifested by the occupation of the east land in the reign of Frederick II (1740-1786), after taking over Austrian Silesia (1742, 1745) and then shared with Austria and Russia the Polish territories (5 Aug. 1772, second division between Prussia and Russia on 23 Jan. 1793) the third division on 24 Oct. 1795, In the reign of Frederick William II (1786-1796). During the reign of the two Tsars, the area of Prussia expanded due to its expansionist policy from (118, 926 km²), at the beginning of the reign of Frederick II, to 305, 669 km²²¹.

16 William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: The End of a Dictator*, trans. Zarzis Fathallah, Arbil, Dar Aaras for Printing and Publishing, 2002, 1, p. 96-97.

17 Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography What Maps Tells About Future Conflicts and the War on Destiny*, Trans. Ihab Abdul Rahim Ali, Kuwait, National Council for Culture, Arts and Literature, 2015, p. 103-104. .

18 See: Silviu Costachie and Nicolae Damian, “Ratzel and the German Geopolitical School - the Inception of culture as an essential element and factor in the political geography”, *Revista Română de Geografie Politică* Year XII, No. 2, November 2010, p. 307-308.

19 For more information on the tactical aspects of the German military, see: Bassam Al-Asali, *Military Doctrines in the World (Comparative Study)*, Beirut, Dar Al-Nafais for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, 1993, p. 49-63.

20 For more information about the Prussian reaction and its militarism, see Hashim Saleh al-Tikriti, *A Brief History of Europe in the Eighteenth Century*, Baghdad, Dar Adnan, 2017, p. 95-110.

21 *Ibid*, p. 110.

In the 19th century, German geographers were influenced by the climate and ideas of the centrality of the German position on the European continent, which was stimulated by the continued historical rivalry and hostility in the West with France, especially after its victory over Prussia in the battle of Yena on October 14, 1806, as well as in the east with Russia, which led to a sharp emphasis on the idea of the unity of the people or the German nation (*Das Deutsche Volk*), within the framework of the German nation's search for its identity and self-assertion to the extent of the Germans' feeling of centrality of the German self and its most obvious feature in their modern history, this feeling allowed the Germans to look at others with inferiority and gave them the right to think and seek to impose their will on others and dominate the peoples of Europe. This perception was a result of the subordination of the German mind to the acquisition exercised by a group of philosophers, historians, thinkers and intellectuals and German writers through their writings, such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Johann Gttilieb Fichte (1752-1814), Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-852), Heinrich von Treitschke (1798-1824) and August Heinrich Hoffmann (1874- 1898), Johann Joseph Gorres (1776- 1848), Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769- 1860), and many others who believed that the Germans were superior to European domination and the link between state power and foreign wars in order to obtain its living space²².

The unification of Germany in 1871 was a major factor in the growth of these tendencies. After unification, the German Reich witnessed the expansion of the militarization of society and the glorification of the Prussian military spirit. The victories of the Prussian army in its wars against Austria and France (1870) exploited by propaganda, the influence of this spread to the ranks of schools, and the establishment of thousands of warrior associations based on the principle of glorification of the Tsar and the army as a guarantee for unified Germany. In keeping with its ambition of a search for a "place under the sun", Germany was preparing to resume expansion to the east, but this direction was not the only one but coincided with its claims for colonies within the Atlantic and Africa²³.

22 For more information on the influence of the ideas of these philosophers in Germany and the promotion of racism, see: Haidar Shaker Al-Sultani, *Anti-Semitism in Nazi Thought and Practice 1920-1945*, unpublished PH. D. thesis, Baghdad University / Faculty of Arts, 2010, Chapters 2 and 3; Abdul Raouf Snnow, "German Nationalism and its Manifestations of Unity, Racism and Imperialism, 1806-1990", in Burhan Ghalioun and others, *Arabism and the 21st Century*, Beirut, Future Movement, 2009, p.99.

23 Witlesi, Op. Cit., p. 38-41; Aziz Abdulla Madllum, *Bismarck's Diplomatic Policy and Competition Towards the German Colonies in Africa*, unpublished Ph. D Thesis, University of St Clements, Political Science, 2011, p. 56-133.

The geographical propositions and ideas of the expansion and the trend towards the East were strengthened and their presence was further established in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, the geographical propositions and ideas of the expansion and the trend towards the East were strengthened and their presence was further established in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century. The foundation of the Pan-Germanism movement was an indicator of the German elites' response to the challenges of German evolution. At the same time, this movement was a tool for spreading such visions more widely than ever before. The Pan-Germanism sponsored these statements between 1891-1914, and entered mechanisms of control and social direction and its mixture of nationalist and chauvinistic ideas was based on ethnic arguments that assumed that Germany sought to move its borders in line with the goals of achieving and maintaining its national-ethnic unity and providing the necessities of life at the expense of others²⁴, in line with Germany's weight in the international arena. According to the rules of procedure of the Pan-Germanism:

“The Pan-German movement seeks to revitalize the German national position, and to strengthen the awareness that all members of the German people have a single racial and cultural identity. This task calls upon the Pan-German movement to: preserve the German race [Volkstum] in Europe and abroad. Solving education and education issues in line with ethnic tendencies ... and advocating for an active policy that seeks German interests throughout the world, particularly the continuation of the German colonial movement”²⁵.

Pan-German also declared that the state's mission is to guarantee a better condition for the nation life and the possibility of playing it a major role in the world. Ernst Friedrich Hasse²⁶ (14 Feb. 1846-12 Jan. 1908), secretary-general of the Pan-German, noted that expansion was “*a necessary stage for the development of an alive and healthy body*”, a reference to the need for Germany's regional expansion.

24 Pierre Renovan and Jean-Baptiste Duroziel, *An Introduction to the History of International Relations*, trans. Fayez Kamekash, vol. 3, Beirut, Oydat Publications, 1989, p. 289-290 ; Wilesi, Op. Cit., p. 40-41.

25 Alfred Kruck, *Die Geschichte des Alldeutschen Verbandes 1890-1939 [The History of the Pan-German League 1890-1939]*. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1954, p. 10 f; See also: Hofmeister, Björn, *Between Monarchy and Dictatorship Radical Nationalism and social Mobilization of the Pan-German League 1914-1939*, Unpublished D. Ph. Dissertation in History, Georgetown University School of Arts and Sciences, 2012, p. 25-67.

26 For more information about Heinrich Class See: Richard S. Levy (Ed.), *Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution*, California, Abcocio, Vol. 1(A-K), 2005, P. 130.

This was confirmed by Heinrich Class (29 Feb. 1868 - 16 Apr. 1953), one of the most prominent leaders of the university, when he said in 1913:

“The hunger of the land is stamping its trait in our present time, and it wants to be satiated and must be satisfied. This is imposed on the German people as a duty”²⁷.

As early of the twentieth century there was another qualitative addition to geopolitics, manifested by the emergence of the “Heartland” theory of the English geographer Halford Mackinder, which served as a warning against those tendencies and expansionist tendencies in German thought. Mackinder presented his theory in his “The Geographical Pivot of History” published in 1904²⁸ and made further changes on it in his research published in 1919. This theory is one of the important additions to the Germans geopolitical advocates, even after the amendments of 1942²⁹. They were designed to warn against the future dangers of the German geopolitical ideas and attempt to contain it and to maintain the “status quo” in Europe. In contrast to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory of naval powers (1840- 1914), which confirmed the supremacy and dominance of naval forces on the ground forces in its geopolitical calculations³⁰, MacKinder predicted the transition of world control from the naval powers (England and France) to the land powers (Germany and Russia), and explained his main idea of the theory of “The Heartland” that whoever rules eastern Europe (Heartland) who can dominate the world island, and who controls the world island controls the world³¹. According to this description, the buffer zones between the Germans and the Slavs, extending from Estonia to Bulgaria, in Makinder’s opinion, became the key to global domination, and thus are open areas for both German and Russian influence³².

27 Renovan and Duroziel, Op. Cit., p. 289-290.

28 H. J. Mackinder, " The Geographical pivot of History ", *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, No. 4, April 1904, p. 421-437.

29 Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, Washington D C, National Defense Uni. Press, 1942.

30 See: A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon history 1660-1783*, 11th Ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1918, p. 1-450; Margreit Tittl Sprout, "Mahan: Missionary for Maritime Power, " in: Edward Mead Earl others. , Op. Cit., p. 113-214. .

31 Mackinder, *The Geographical Pivot*, p. 421-437.

32 Riyadh, Op. Cit., p. 63.

Secondly: Karl Haushofer's Role in Rooting the Living Space Theory in The Nazi Mind

The Nazis invested the knowledge gained by geographical thought in the first half of the 20th century. Karl Haushofer, (1869 - 1945) German military and geographer, was the main factor in the consolidation of the geographical knowledge development in the Nazi mind and the development of Nazi concepts in this regard. he was one of the most prominent geographers who emerged in the geopolitical field, adopted the principles and ideas of Ratzel, Kjellen, and MacKinder, especially those related to the geography of the Great State. He was influenced by the idea of "geographical Space" and emphasized that this space "controlled the history of mankind", he believed that the state would either expand or perish, and this means that the application of the principle of the establishment of great powers means the disappearance of small political units³³. Haushofer introduced a geopolitical definition: "*Political science based on the geographical basis and knowledge of its practical applications in foreign policy, and its goal is to give the intellectual support necessary to protect and expand the living space of Germany and for the benefit of its population*"³⁴.

He called before the First World War, in his theory known as the "*Transcontinental Bloc Theory*", to an alliance between Germany and the Austria-Hungary Empire, Russia and Japan on the grounds that these continental powers have enough power to make them able to fight naval forces dominance, but he was forced to amend his theory that after the outcome of the war and the collapse and disintegration of the three European empires (Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary), and after studying the "the heartland" theory of Mackinder by the 1920, he invested the main point of contention between the recent theory and the goals sought by Haushofer that targeted mainly to change the "status quo" and not keep it, but Haushofer was taken from the main idea of the theory of Mackinder, "the heartland" mainly to modify his theory of "Transcontinental Bloc"³⁵.

After his appointment at the University of Munich to teach geography and military history in 1919, Haushofer had a platform that helped him to disseminate his ideas

33 Russell H. Feffield and C. Etzel Percy, *Geopolitics*, trans. Joseph Megley and Louis Scandar, Cairo, Karnak Publishing, Printing and Distribution, No D., p. 39-40.

34 Fuad Hama Khurshid, *Geopolitics Concept and Practice*, Baghdad, Dar al-Sha'un al-thkahiya, 2009, p. 38.

35 Spang, Karl Haushofer re-examined, p. 142l-144.

in geopolitics and history and to promote his theory throughout Germany. Not only that, but strengthening the views of each of his predecessors in the field of geopolitics, and the most dangerous thing in the philosophy of Haushofer political advocacy of German expansion and conflict and the total war³⁶. The most recent terms that expressed the views of the Munich school are expansive or strategic-war terminology, the most common being those that expressed the idea of living space and the term “*self-economic sufficiency*”. In addition to these terms, there are three general principles of this school:

- The principle of the “Giant state” or the “Great state” called by Frederick Ratzel.
- The principle of the “heartland” and the global island developed by MacKinder in his two researches of 1904 and 1919.
- The principle of dual continents: one in the north and the other in the south, and which together constitute a regional continental bloc with self-economic sufficiency; the north offers manufactured goods, and the south is its living space in the production of raw materials and marketing.

These three principles interacted together and formed the main lines of Haushofer's ideas, his Transcontinental Bloc extends to the European bloc, which includes Greater Russia, (most of the territory of the Soviet Union except Eastern Siberia) and connects to Asia through Iran, Afghanistan and India, and the fate of Greater Russia depended on its agreements with Germany, otherwise it would become part of the German Empire. The second bloc is the Greater East Asia, which includes Japan, the Eastern Soviet Union, China, Southeast Asia, Burma, Indonesia, Australia and most of the Pacific Ocean. And this bloc under Japanese leadership. The Munich school believed that there must be areas of separation between the major powers within the continental divisions, and that these regions and the system of self-sufficiency of the major states will lead to the creation of the desired international balance³⁷.

36 Ewald W. Schnitzer, " German Geopolitics Revived ", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Aug., 1955, p. 408.

37 For more information, See: Cornelia Lüdecke, " Carl Ritters (1779-1859) Einfluß auf die Geographie bis hin zur Geopolitik Karl Haushofers (1869-1946)"(Carl Ritters (1779-1859) influence geography up to the geopolitics of Karl Haushofer), *Sudhoffs Archiv*, Bd. 88, H. 2, 2004, p. 129-152.; Florence Ayscough, "*Japan und die Japaner by Karl Haushofer*", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, No. 3 (Jul., 1924), p. 473-474; Bruno Lasker, "*Japan Und Die Japaner Karl Haushofer*", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 6 (Jun. - Jul., 1933), p. 319-320.

Haushofer viewed to the “Great State” principle from a purely national point of view, and he felt that it was imperative for Germany to swallow the small countries in western and eastern Germany, and that it is fine to do so by force of arms to secure Germany’s full control of the European continent. He saw, on MacKander’s global island, the spatial framework of German domination and the formation of a new world order. The Munich School had two fundamental goals on the global island: The first objective is to control on Russia to secure German rule over all of Europe (Asia and Europe). The second objective is to destroy the British Empire and its naval power to secure full German control over the entire world island (Europe, Asia and Africa). The realization of this project was in fact accompanied by the idea of a total war. Haushofer believed that continental countries had intrinsic advantages over naval powers³⁸.

The establishment of the Geopolitical Institute in Munich in 1924 by a number of German geographers led by Haushofer, and sponsored by the German Geographical Society, gave considerable impetus to the maturation of qualitative geopolitical theories. Haushofer became president of the Institute, and he attracted a group of leading German geographers such as Erich Obst (September 13, 1886 - June 9, 1981) and Otto Jessen (18 February 1891 - 9 June 1951), Gustaf Fochler Hauke 4 August 1906 - 20 January 1996), Otto Maull (8 May 1887 - 16 December 1957) and Albrecht Haushofer (7 January 1903) April 1945) the son of Karl Haushofer and many others³⁹. These professors have made significant contributions to the development of geopolitical thought in Germany⁴⁰. Haushofer personally played a pivotal role in influencing Nazi expansionist political thought⁴¹.

Under the patronage of this institute, the first issue of a scientific journal entitled “*The Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*” appeared for the first time in January 1924. It included a hybrid of geopolitical, historical, national and colonial thought. German

38 See: Peter Schöller, "Die Rolle Karl Haushofers für Entwicklung und Ideologie nationalsozialistischer Geopolitik "(Karl Haushofer's Role in the Development and Ideology of National Socialist Geopolitics), *Erdkunde*, Bd. 36, H. 3, Sep., 1982, p. 160-167.

39 Riyadh, Op. Cit., p. 98-99; K. P. Mukerji, " The Emergence of Geopolitics (in the inter-war period)", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 4, October—December, 1948, pp.11-24

40 Trevor J. Barnes and Christian Abrahamsson, "Tangled complicities and moral struggles: the Haushofers, father and son, and the spaces of Nazi geopolitics", *Journal of Historical Geography*, No. 47, 2015, p. 64-73.

41 Riyadh, Op. Cit., p. 98-99; See also: Dan Diner, "Grundbuch des Planeten: Zur Geopolitik Karl Haushofers"(Land Registry of the Planet: On the Geopolitics of Karl Haushofer), *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 32. Jahrg., 1. H., Jan., 1984, p. 1-28

geographers, in this institute, studied the laws of the growth of the land state as an organic being and its growth is inevitable. The pioneers of this institute have invested the results of geo-historical, archeological and geopolitical research in establishing the central idea that the state is an organic being and must grow “biologically” by expansion its borders to include suited land to its economic and strategic requirements. they tried to demonstrate Germany’s right to control lands and countries in Eastern Europe⁴². In the first issue of the Geopolitical Journal of January 1924, the term “Living Space” was adopted for the first time to reflected all these concepts and its evolutionary paths⁴³. Haushofer met Rudolf Hess (26 Apr. 1894 - 17 Aug. 1987) for the first time in 1919, and later he met Hitler in 1920, and the connection grew deeper between the two after three years, Haushofer described as “*the man behind Hitler*”. This helped to shift the influence of his ideas to Hitler and to redesign and engineer the Nazi ideas of expansion towards Eastern Europe⁴⁴. When Hess and Hitler were imprisoned in Landsberg prison in 1924, after the failed coup of 1923, Haushofer visited them on a frequent basis every Wednesday morning from Jun. 24 to Dec. 12, 1924. He brought books and editorials of the journal and his own writings to Hitler in prison, as well as some anthology of historical and philosophical books of well-known historians and philosophers such as Leopold von Ranke (21 Dec.1795 - 23 May 1886), Heinrich Treitschke, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche (15 Oct. 1844 - 25 Aug. 1900) And Houston Stewart Chamberlain (9 Sep. 1855 - 9 Dec. 1927), Ratzel, Kjellen and others⁴⁵.

Haushofer knew Hitler at the most dangerous stages of Hitler’s mental construction, which he describes it in his “Secret Conversations” as “*the prison time was an incentive to deepen my ideas, which until then were only instinctive idea*”⁴⁶, which is a significant indication of the depth of Haushofer’s influence in molding Hitler’s ideas which until then was in the process of ferment and crystallization. So, one of the researchers likened Hitler at this stage to the “dry sponge” that absorbed the

42 For more information, see: Costachie and Damian, Op. Cit., p. 307-308.

43 Spang, Karl Haushofer re-examined, p. 137.

44 Christian W. Spang, *Karl Haushofer und Japan: Die Rezeption Seiner Geopolitischen Theorien in der Deutschen und Japanischen Politik*, [Karl Haushofer and Japan: The Reception of his Geopolitical Theories in German and Japanese Politics], Munich: Ludicium, Berlin, Hartmut Walravens, 2013, p. 199, 205.

45 Spang, Karl Haushofer und Japan, p. 208.

46 Hugh Trevor Roper (Ed.), *Hitler’s Secret Conversations 1941- 1943*, New York, The New American Library, 1961, p. 235.

ideas of Haushofer⁴⁷, if we remember that this stage experienced Hitler in writing “My Struggle= Mein Kampf”, which shows the extent that in which Haushofer and others like the English philosopher with racist ideology Houston Stewart Chamberlain who visited him in prison⁴⁸, to entrench racial concepts in the mind of Hitler and the guiding compass of thinking about the vital area, it appeared clearly in Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” which was in tune, in its content, with the theses of Munich Institute, which was chaired by Haushofer content⁴⁹.

From 1924 onwards, the living space theory, which was mainly based on the “Rush to the East” is a clear indication of the influence of the Nazi leadership on the views of Haushofer and the Munich Institute. The living space theory before 1923 was not mentioned in the Nazi literature until after Haushofer adopted the term in the first issue of the journal of Geopolitics in January 1924, after the year mentioned the term in Nazi literature frequently and regularly in particular in Hitler’s Main Kampf, he also used many of the vocabulary of Haushofer used in his “Great Japan= *Dai Nihon*”⁵⁰.

This accumulation of knowledge in geography and geopolitics identified the features of Nazi activity aimed at changing the reality of Germany on the stage of international politics. At the same time Haushofer found in Hitler the right person to embody the theory of “hero” and guide the course of German history according to the geopolitical vision. Haushofer, as he is known, was “likes to emphasize the part of the hero in the formulation of history”. Therefore, he describes Hitler on the 50th anniversary of his birth in 1939 as a “statesman” who brings together the “*Blood of Klaufitz*” and “*the space and soil of Ratzel*”⁵¹. This level of identification and sharp overlap in the Nazi ideology, between the racist tendencies that established the centrality of German self in the mind of Hitler, which was influenced on the German philosophical heritage, and the centrality of the expansionist tendencies towards Eastern Europe in German political history fueled by the products of geopolitics and geographical thought, was firmly established in the Nazism living space theory, which was provided motivation and justification for the determination of the Nazi leadership to guide the paths of

47 Holger H. Herwig, *The Daemon of Geopolitics: Karl Haushofer, Rudolf Hess, Adolf Hitler*, University of Calgary, p. 10.

48 Spang, *Karl Haushofer und Japan*, p. 207-208.

49 See: Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Lewis El Hajj, Beirut, Besan, 1995, p. 160-187, 353-368.

50 Herwig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 10.

51 Kaplan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 109-110.

international politics and then to make the history of that stage of the history of Europe and the world, Kamenetsky pointed out this combination of various ideological elements that governed the direction of the Nazi leadership, when he pointed that the Nazism one of the two totalitarian ideologies “*unlike preceding models they took most of their principles and goals not from mythology, religion, or clearly defined tradition, but from ‘scientific laws’ Racism, materialism, geopolitics, Darwinism, and twisted interpretations of history became models for building the new society*”⁵².

Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903- 2002), one of the Austrian geographers who lived in the Nazi era, presented in his 1942 “*Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*” an accurate explanation of the Nazis’ perception of geopolitics, and Strauss-Hupé believes that the Nazism tried to guide the history movement based on the geopolitics and its outputs “*The Nazi war machine is the instrument of conquest; geopolitics is the master plan designed to guide those who use the tool to invade who and how*”⁵³. These concepts reinforced Hitler’s convictions and made him eager to war on the basis that it is the true test of the nation’s will to live and struggle for survival according to the social Darwinian perspective, and the war is the final judgment logic in international relations ⁵⁴. This vision was formed from metaphors and perceptions that are in fact the product of a profound civilized crisis that was not the birth of the twentieth century, but rather rooted in an ancient intellectual legacy and capitalist socialization since the nineteenth century⁵⁵. So, in the context of the following topic, there will be debates for two basic point: The first is directly related to the context of German history and the philosophical and intellectual system that formed the Nazi mind. The second is related to the nature of the economic challenges which faced by Nazi Germany within the framework of the development of the German capitalist economy between the two wars.

Thirdly: The Geographical Framework of the Living Space and its Economic Motives in the Nazi Thought and Application

In the eyes of the Nazis, the importance of the living space lies in two main elements: the geographical framework that, in strategic terms, achieves the protection of the citizens of the state and the confrontation of any external

52 Ihor Kamenetsky, *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies*, New York, Bookman Associates, 1961, p. 19.

53 Kaplan, Op. Cit., p. 111.

54 Herwig, Op. Cit., p. 10.

55 Dan Diner, “‘Grundbuch’ Des Planeten Zur Geopolitik Karl Haushofers”, *Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte, Jahrgang 32, Heft 1*, 1984, p. 1-2.

aggression⁵⁶. But the most important point of this geographical framework is that it provides the introduction of European-global domination. The second principle is to achieve self-sufficiency or “economic self-sufficiency”, which Haushofer stresses, by choosing the geographically diverse geographical area. The work to achieve the requirements of these two elements made the option of war is the only one available to accomplish this project:

As far as concerned the geographical framework of the living space, the Nazi leaders have pointed out about it on more than one occasion, Hitler’s ideas in his book “My Struggle” and his passionate speeches to his followers were clearly focused on concepts related to that geographical framework, especially those that have implications for it such as the concepts of “*Volkstaat*”, Social Darwinism, “Flexible Boundaries” or “The Heartland”, which Mackinder put forward. for example, Hitler’s statement that “*the Hohenzlern empire made mistakes in obtaining colonies in Africa*”, stressing that “*the policy of expanding the borders by adding the land is not in ‘Cameroon’ but in Europe and not elsewhere*”. He was convinced that the appropriate land can only be obtained in the “East Europe”, and this the same focal area called by Mackinder the term “Heartland”, noting that access to the living space:

“If we seek a land in Europe, it is possible only in the East ... it is possible to get it vast at the expense of Russia only, and this means that the new Reich will resort for the second time to the behavior of the ancient ‘Teutons’ Knights (Die Ritter Teutons) road to get, by the German sword, on the fields of the German plow and daily bread of nation... What if the present handlers objected to this? then the law of the species conservation would come into force; and what could not be given by friendly means would be forcibly get it”⁵⁷.

Hitler believed that the Nazi regime would be primarily responsible for solving this dilemma in Germany and wrote:

“The National Socialist Movement will not allow sixty million Germans to live on a patch of land of no more than half a million square kilometers. The National Socialist Movement considers one of its most sacred duties to remove this painful reality and to bridge the gap created by foreign policy in the last two decades between our glorious historical past and our sad present”⁵⁸.

56 See: Riyadh, Op. Cit., p. 66-67.

57 Shirer, Op Cit, trans. Gerges Fathallah, p. 96-97.

58 Hitler, Op. Cit., p. 155.

On the basis of these convictions, the Nazi regime had to seriously consider a number of factors that formed a central part of the comprehensive framework of its expansionist theory. If the reading of the German heritage contributed to the building of an intellectual and philosophic system that provided racist and geopolitical justification for the launching of the Nazi expansion project and the imperial extension, the practical needs, especially economic ones, from the perspective of the Nazis, were a pressing element that must be given serious attention to its requirements, the most important of which is control of the appropriate geographical environment. The great German economic development required the transition to imperial expansion in response to the requirements of that evolution, after World War I prevented this, the Nazi leadership felt that the resumption of this transition had become a basic requirement of the supplies of the German economy and its growth. The Great Depression of (1929-1933) and its serious repercussions on the structure of the German economic system⁵⁹ added another reason for the intense interest in providing the requirements for that transition. Henry A. Turner, who discussed some of the Nazi economic policies, asserted that since Hitler became a chancellor to Germany (January 30, 1933). These two elements in his expansionist strategy were important. He wrote "*Hitler's economic ideology dominated by two fundamental elements - the 'racial factor' and the Imperialism factor which was conditional acquisition of the living space*"⁶⁰.

The historical paradox, that the ambition of achieving the imperial extension in the 1930s, in a world where international trade had been greatly reduced by the consequences of the economic crisis, provided, according to the Nazi view at that historical stage, all sorts of advantages and solutions to the economic problems suffered by Germany. Unlike the other big powers that enjoyed better status, Germany suffered from limited resources, Britain, for example, was the center of the vast Sterling region with a common currency and tariff, and the Soviet Union, which had vast territories and resources from the Caucasus, Siberia and Central Asia, as well as the United States and France. Germany was therefore aspiring to build an empire with potential and resources commensurate with the needs of its rapidly growing economy.

59 See the original table in: Dietmar Petzina, Werner Abelshauser, and Anselm Faust (eds), *Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, Materialien zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 1914-1945*, Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1978, Vol. III, p. 84.

60 Henry A. Turner, Jr., "Hitler's Secret Pamphlet for Industrialists", *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 40, No.3, 1968, p. 362.

There is no doubt that the argument on which the idea of an urgent need for the living space of sustaining and investing surplus human resources, based on an overly pessimistic view of economic development⁶¹, but it seems to have been a strong argument at that time, according to the prevailing thinking of political economy at the time, and at least influential in Germany to a large extent. The need for a living space, according to the Haushofer convictions, was to bring prosperity to a densely populated country with limited sources of food and raw materials. Germany's population jumped from 41, 059 million in 1870 to 64, 926 million in 1910⁶², with a population density of 363 inhabitants per square mile, fourth after Britain (487 inhabitants per square mile), Japan (469 inhabitants per square mile) and Italy (418 inhabitants per square mile)⁶³. While the population growth in Germany did not correspond to any significant increase in agricultural land area or significant development in production capacity⁶⁴. In a similar way, the Danish farmer owned more land, with 229% of German farms, and British farms 182% more than German, and French farms 34% more than German. Compared to 1927, German food consumption declined in 1937 for meat, Milk, eggs, vegetables, fish, sugar and tropical fruits⁶⁵. What is the solution? The solution, then, from Hitler's point of view and his system, is to acquire the living space, because it will provide the economic adequacy and preparedness necessary only for the launch of global hegemony:

“Our people have fought the war as an alleged global force ... I say ‘alleged’ because Germany was not a world power, it was carrying arms and was not prepared to meet with its enemies. It did not have any spare materials to show its long resistance, because the German territories were too narrow and the efforts of the active German people were limited to the country's good soil. But its gifts have become a little with the days, to meet the needs of the growing populationThe basic condition for Germany to attain

61 On the basis that agricultural and industrial production was sufficient to sustain the population despite the subsequent population increase compared to the population at the end of the 1930s. Italy increased its population after sixty years, 17%, Britain 28%, France 42%, Germany 64% and Japan 84%. Although everyone did not have empires after decolonization, however, the economies of these countries grew and developed faster than the stage where some had Empires are vast.

62 Hermann Aubin and Wolfgang Zorn (eds.), *Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte* [*Handbook of German Economic and Social History*]. Stuttgart, 1971-76, vol. 2, p. 18.

63 Ferguson, Op. Cit., p. 6

64 Aubin and Zorn, Op. Cit, vol. 2, p. 512.

65 Ferguson, Op. Cit., p. 6

the status of the Great State is to achieve the living range that provides to its people the survival requirements”⁶⁶.

The other side, which is linked to the principle of “economic self-sufficiency” is the motivation given by this approach to war as a means to achieve its requirements. Hitler went to apply most of the principles he borrowed from Haushofer, especially the question of strengthening the Economic structure of Germany. This economic trend coincided with the growth of the German capitalist economy accelerated since the nineteenth century⁶⁷, so the other need to pay attention to the acquisition of the living space, is to embark on an armament program as a tool to implement the ambitions of expansion and also a means for economic recovery.

The rebuilding of the army was a priority for Hitler⁶⁸. In February 1933, he told some army commanders: “*The most dangerous stage is the rebuilding of the armed forces*”. He reiterated on February 8 to ministers in his cabinet that the principle should be “All for the armed forces”⁶⁹. But the construction of any military force necessitated access to strategic raw materials. The development of military technology radically changed the balance of world power; military power was no longer dependent on coal and iron, as was the case in the 19th century. The role of oil and rubber emerged as vital elements of military technology. The United States, the British Empire and the Soviet Union or countries under direct or indirect influence of these countries controlled the production of these goods. At that time, US oil fields alone produced about 70% of the world’s crude oil production⁷⁰.

On the other hand, the German General Staff, agreed that the German nation should not be subjected to a similar crisis as that of 1914-1918 and the depletion of the trench warfare, therefore prepared for serious measures of armament, tactics and military strategy⁷¹. All this required mechanisms, vehicles and heavy

66 Hitler, Op. Cit., p. 154- 155.

67 Diner, Op. Cit., p. 1-2.

68 Hitler, Op. Cit., p. 153ff.

69 Conference of Ministers, 8 February 1933, *D. G. F. P.* (Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945), Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1949), Ser. C, Vol. I, No. 16.

70 Oil fields in the Middle East did not have the dominant position today. Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Gulf states accounted for less than 7% of total world production in 1940. In addition, these countries were in the hands of British or American companies, mainly Anglo-Persian, Royal Dutch- Shell and Standard Oil. See: Ferguson, Op. Cit, p. 7.

71 Earl, “The Nazi Idea of War” in: Earl and others. , Op. Cit., P. 429.

weapons capable of moving quickly and maneuvering and applying new concepts such as *blitzkrieg*. Modern warfare standards, which are equipped with modern mechanisms capable of implementing the new military plans and tactics adopted by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, relied on internal combustion engines, rubber tires, aircraft, tanks and ships, as well as rifles, missiles. The application of this vision necessitated the construction and manufacture of machinery and equipment of an advanced type of steel made from a mixture of rare metals in certain percentages such as Antimony, Chromium, Cobalt, Manganese, Mercury, Molybdenum, Nickel, Titanium, Tungsten and Vanadium. Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union collectively dominated the production of these materials, almost all the world's production of cobalt, manganese, molybdenum, nickel and vanadium, about three-quarters of chromium, titanium, and half tungsten. The former German colony of South West Africa, which had come under British control, was practically the only source of vanadium. The Soviet Union, followed by India, dominated almost every manganese production. Nickel was largely a Canadian monopoly⁷².

The completion of these huge Nazi projects in a short period of time, was collided with a German economic reality lacks the required elements, especially deficit in the reserves of gold and raw materials⁷³, as well as Germany's lack of imperial extension, which helps get the raw material needed, because the bulk of the world's supply of vital raw materials was within the boundaries of the four competing forces: the British Empire, the French Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States⁷⁴. Germany's domestic coal supply was plentiful and owned the largest iron and steel industry in Europe⁷⁵, but before the 1930s it needed to import both rubber and oil. So, the living space was an urgent need for a state like Germany, and this aspiration of military parity with these powers without large imports of goods that were monopolized by these powers, left Germany with no choice but to pursue an expansionist policy. We will try to clarify this by discussing the content of the following two points:

The first point: Germany cannot rely on free trade for goods, because the free

⁷² Ferguson, Op. Cit, p. 7.

⁷³ Romar Correa, "Hitler's Money: The Bills of Exchange of Schacht and Rearmament in the Third Reich", *American Review of Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2002, p. 17-18.

⁷⁴ Ferguson, Op. Cit., p. 7.

⁷⁵ See: Tables (7), (8), (9) in: A. C. B., Tyler, *The Struggle for Sovereignty in Europe 1848-1918*, Fadel Jaketer, Beirut, The Arab Cultural Center, 2009, p. 32-33.

trade has declined significantly in the 1930s due to the imposition of customs protection duties. Germany's exports fell sharply⁷⁶, and negatively affected the level of imports, which relied mainly on government revenues due to the lack of hard currency and the weak value of the German Mark, which reflected negatively on the provision of strategic raw materials required by the rearmament program⁷⁷.

There is no doubt that armaments programs were also designed to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis, it absorbed a large proportion of the unemployed after unemployment rates increased in Germany, according to official estimates, in March 1932 reached 8 million and 750 thousand, while some researchers said that the real figures were higher than so much⁷⁸. In addition, the arms projects caused a sudden recovery in the physical condition of many factories in Germany, and saved many industries from the deep crisis caused by the great depression, some major industrial companies that until then specialized in certain conventional products began to diversify and invent new ideas in the production pattern for example, shipyards, creating new branches that began to design and build aircraft. It is therefore possible to say that the German rearmament process has become an opportunity for technological development and improvements in some cases, especially in the field of air navigation⁷⁹. It should be noted, however, that the Nazi propaganda devoted to highlighting the economic successes of the Nazis was huge and highly exaggerated, which hindered the stabilization process in a precise description of the Nazi economic achievement⁸⁰. In addition, the allocation of resources for rearmament has placed a heavy burden on the balance of foreign exchange. On one hand, the allocation of domestic resources to the armament program will impede the increase in exports and, on the other, the heavy demand of strategic raw materials was a burden on foreign exchange reserves and gold⁸¹.

76 For more information about the German Foreign exchange balance 1938-1941 see Tables 1 and 2 in: A. O. Ritschl, "Nazi economic imperialism and the exploitation of the small: evidence from Germany's secret foreign exchange balances, 1938-1940", *Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2001, p. 328.

77 E. William Carr, *Arms, Autarky and Aggression: A Study in German Foreign Policy 1933-1939*, London, Edward Arnold, 1972; Robertson, E. M., *Hitler's Pre- War Policy and Military Plans 1933- 1939*, London, Longmans, 1963, p. 36ff.

78 Correa, Op. Cit, p. 17-18.

79 Turner, Op. Cit, p. 362.

80 See: Norbert Frey, *State of the Fuhrer: The Nazi Rule 1933-1945*, Reham Nabil Salem, Review of Abdullah Abu Heshah, London, Dar Al-Hikma, 2016, p. 109-116.

81 Robert L. Hetzel, "German Monetary History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century", *Economic Quarterly* (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond), Volume 88, No. 1, Winter 2002, p. 19-20.

The second point: Germany lacked sufficient international reserves of gold to pay for its required imports. The growing rearmament process that opened Germany's appetite for the importation of vital materials, against the scarcity of gold reserves, made the German budget suffer from a chronic deficit in the Nazi era. Although national income increased from 10 billion Marks in 1928 to 15 billion Marks in 1939, but this increase was offset by an increase in government spending, which jumped from 12 billion Marks in 1928 to more than 30 billion Marks in 1939, and the government debt exceeded 40 billion Marks⁸². Germany continued to suffer a budget deficit until 1941⁸³, the high costs of armament and the absence of adequate reserves it paid the Government to enhance the effectiveness of privatization policy⁸⁴. With no hard currency reserves and ample foreign credit channels, Germany could not get the money needed to pay for imports.

Hjalmar Schacht (22 Jan. 1877- 4 Jun. 1970), President of the Reich Bank (1933-1934) and Minister of Economy (1934-37) tried to maintain the price of the Mark by means of certain economic arrangements, including the imposition of control over foreign exchange, and the adoption of the principle of barter in foreign trade⁸⁵, but a clear gap emerged between Hitler's military ambitions and the available economic resources, this was particularly evident in 1934 in the crisis of foreign exchange, which saw a sharp drop in imports⁸⁶.

Hitler's memorandum on the four-year plan in 1936 was designed to address the difficulties of the German economic situation, he pointed out that the demographic momentum and the impossibility of increasing agricultural production greatly make Germany insufficient to provide food for the people. The second point in the memorandum discussed the deficit in the production of raw materials lacking in Germany and the search for alternatives. At the end of the memorandum, Hitler decided that the "final solution" to the problems of the German economy would only be achieved "*in expanding our living space and obtaining raw materials and foodstuffs for our nation*"⁸⁷.

⁸² Turner, Op. Cit, p. 362.

⁸³ See Table 2 in: Ritschl, Op. Cit, p. 329; Frey, Op. Cit., p. 111-112.

⁸⁴ Germa Bel, "Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany", *Economic History Review* (2009), p, 1.

⁸⁵ Hetzel, Op. Cit., p. 19-20.

⁸⁶ See: Ritschl, Op. Cit, , p. 324-345.

⁸⁷ Ferguson, Op. Cit, p. 8-9.

Economy Minister Hjalmar Schacht rejected the contents of Hitler's memorandum because he found a serious threat to German industry. He believed in possibility of offsetting foreign currency reserves could be compensated by a complex system based on export subsidies, import restrictions and the adoption of trade by bilateral agreements. Hitler ignored the arguments of Schacht, because it would simply block the pace of rearming and the strategy of stockpiling raw materials and hard currency. He insisted that the solution to the problem was to complete the construction of the army and to prepare for the actual acquisition of the living space. This may explain the reasons for the meeting held by Hitler on October 5, 1937 with his military commanders, which is detailed in Colonel Frederick Hossbach Memorandum, known as the controversial "Hossbach Memorandum"⁸⁸. Hitler, at the meeting, set a time limit to start moving in order to have the living space (four years), but the pressure of economic necessity prompted Hitler to move quickly to gain the living space in part, so his attention shifted to the annexation of Austria on March 12, 1938⁸⁹ and Czechoslovakia since 1 October 1938. The significance of this is found in the adoption of the main revenues of German trade 1938-1939 on the gold reserves obtained by Germany from Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 1 September 1939, the German legions went to invade Poland and share its territory with the Soviets, its territory was the closest sphere of living space to the nucleus of the alleged global Germanic state.

The transformation of German military operations into the western front in April, May, and June 1940, when the German armies took control of the territory of some Scandinavian, Netherlands and French territories, was for strategic objectives, foremost of which was the securing of the western border and ensuring continued access to iron supplies from Sweden through the Norwegian port of Narvik, as well as some other benefits envisaged by the German leadership, such as expanding access to gold reserves from the banks of the French capital, but the primary goal is to devote to military operations on the eastern front and more importantly from the point of view of the Nazis, since the control of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe was one of the main axes of the theory of German global

88 Minutes of a Conference in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, November 5, 1937, from 4:15 to 8:30 P.M., D. G. F. P., Ser. D, Vol. 1.

89 For more information about *Anschluss* economic benefits on German economy see: Maurice Williams, "German Imperialism and Austria 1938", in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 14, 1979, p. 139-153.

hegemony.⁹⁰ In 1941, German forces invaded the plains of Ukraine, Belarus and even the Volga, the same places that Haushofer established for the growth of the German state. In order to implement German hegemony plans, German troops arrived in Moscow and Stalin Grad and imposed a siege on the two cities. this dialectic was of the Nazi ideology and its attempt to gain a living space that guided the history of Europe at that stage. A country needs a large and well-equipped military force in order to obtain a living space, but such an army can only be obtained by expanding and gaining living space, and without a war it is not possible to achieve this project. The Nazi regime attempted to overcome this dialectic by acquiring a living space in part (the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia) to help complete the construction of the army by replacing diplomatic skills and maneuvers with careful investment in international circumstances and crises.

Conclusions

There have been many and varied historical treatments for the reasons of the Second World War, the discussion about these reasons led to research direction aimed at reviewing the history of this war and everything related to it, and all these views that were raised and discussed within this framework in general, were external appearance of deeper and more effective motives in directing attitudes of war. Some of these motives were directly related to deep considerations inherent in the nature of the development of geographical thought, especially that which dealt with the phenomenon of the state and its relation to the economic requirements imposed by the nature of the development of the Western capitalist system and its increasing material needs. So, the outbreak of war was final outcome of the interaction between these two types of motives, was only the embodiment of the fact that the war was a product of an intellectual climate contributed by the Western mind in all its spectrum.

On the basis of this introduction, Germany witnessed a special interaction between the system of values and material ideals developed under capitalist growth and modernization project of Germany. the Geopolitics first appeared in a German version, because the German elite was more responsive to its arguments, due to the conditions of Germany's nation construction and its rapid economic growth after 1871, and its complaint of the loss of "justice" in the distribution of colonies before World War I. this development produced philosophical and

90 Omar Al- Farouk Rajab, *Power of the State: Geostrategic Studies*, Cairo, Madbouli Library, 1992, p. 101.

intellectual trends that equipped the German modernization project with moral, psychological justifications, but as a result of the retrogression of its modernization project, her desire of the post-war reprisal and German discontent from the 1919 Versailles compromise. So, all of that was translated into an emotional reaction of vengeance and ambition. So the expansionist program adopted by the Nazis was consistent with the general context of the course of German history and a clear manifestation of its secretions, it is the product of the same intellectual system that espoused the geopolitics and its expansionist theories, especially the living space theory, which gave a strong impetus to the imperial extension doctrine of the ruling German elites.

the Conditions of the German nation creation, at the political and economic level, led to the formation of the Nazi ideology and its strong adherence to the geopolitics, which emphasized the provision of realistic needs and requirements that were vitally linked to the economic security of the state. So, the Geopolitics ideas were the real, realistic engine behind the Nazi expansionist tendencies which led to the outbreak of World War II. The Nazi leadership smoothed all these elements into the crucible of the German ambition. It used a rhetorical discourse that focused on various motives to justify its project and provided some elements to convince public opinion and influence its feelings and aspirations in accordance with ideals and values derived from its intellectual heritage. the state's tendencies in order to provide a sentimental motive and an element of persuasion to the collective mind, may explain the connection of the German expansion project with such justifications or rationales embodied in the terms "Master Race" and "Germany over all".

Bibliography

Documents

Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1949), Ser. C, Vol. I, No. 16; Ser. D, Vol. 1.

Arabic Books and Translated into Arabic

Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Lewis El Hajj, Beirut, Besan, 1995.

Al-Asali, Bassam, *Military Doctrines in the World (Comparative Study)*, Beirut, Dar Al-Nafais for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, 1993. (A. T.)

Frey, Norbert, *State of the Fuhrer: The Nazi Rule 1933-1945*, Reham Nabil Salem, Review of Abdullah Abu Heshah, London, Dar Al-Hikma, 2016. (A. T.)

Feffield, Russell H. and C. Etzel Percy, *Geopolitics*, trans. Joseph Megley and Louis Scandar, Cairo, Karnak Publishing, Printing and Distribution, No D., p. 39-40. (A. T.)

Jassim Sultan, *Geography and the Next Arab Dream: Geopolitics when speaking geographically*, Beirut, Tamkeen Research and Publishing House, 2013. (A. T.)

Kaplan, Robert D., *The Revenge of Geography What Maps Tells About Future Conflicts and the War on Destiny*, Trans. Ihab Abdul Rahim Ali, Kuwait, National Council for Culture, Arts and Literature, 2015. (A. T.)

Khurshid, Fuad Hama, *Geopolitics Concept and Practice*, Baghdad, Dar al-Sha'un al-thkahafiya, 2009. (A. T.)

Othman, Salah Mahmoud, *Darwinism and Man, The Theory of Evolution from Science to Globalization*, Alexandria, Jalal Hazi & Co., 2001. (A. T.)

Renovan, Pierre and Jean-Baptiste Duroziel, *An Introduction to the History of International Relations*, trans. Fayez Kamekash, vol. 3, Beirut, Oydat Publications, 1989. (A. T.)

Riyadh, Mohamed, *General Assets in Geopolitical and Geopolitical*, Cairo, Hendawi Foundation for Education and Culture, 2012. (A. T.)

Shirer, William, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: The End of a Dictator*, trans. Zarzis Fathallah, Arbil, Dar Aaras for Printing and Publishing, 2002. (A. T.)

Al-Tikriti, Hashim Saleh, *A Brief History of Europe in the Eighteenth Century*, Baghdad, Dar Adnan, 2017. (A. T.)

Tyler, A. C. B., *Origins of Second World War*, trans. Mustafa Kamal Khamis, Cairo, Egyptian General Authority for Composition and Publication, 1971(A. T.)

_____, *The Struggle for Sovereignty in Europe 1848-1918*, Fadel Jaketer, Beirut, The Arab Cultural Center, 2009. (A. T.)

Books in English and German

Aubin, Hermann and Wolfgang Zorn, eds. Handbuch der Deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, “*Handbook of German Economic and Social History*”, Vol. 2, Stuttgart, 1971, p. 76.

Carr, E. William, *Arms, Autarky and Aggression: A Study in German Foreign policy 1933-1939*, London, Edward Arnold, 1972.

Chapman, Bert, *Geopolitics: A Guide to the issues*, California, Opraeger, 2011.

Herwig, Holger H., *The Daemon of Geopolitics: Karl Haushofer, Rudolf Hess, Adolf Hitler*, University of Calgary.

Hofmeister, Björn, *Between Monarchy and Dictatorship Radical Nationalism and Social Mobilization of the Pan-German League 1914-1939*, Unpublished D. Ph. Dissertation in History, Georgetown University School of Arts and Sciences, 2012.

Kamenetsky, Ihor, *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies*, New York, Bookman Associates, 1961.

Kjellen, Rudolf, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1917.

Kruck, Alfred, *Die Geschichte des Alldeutschen Verbandes 1890-1939 [The History of the Pan-German League 1890-1939]*. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1954.

Levy, Richard S. (Ed.), *Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution*, California, Abcocio, Vol. 1(A-K), 2005.

Mackinder, Halford J., *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, Washington D C, National Defense Uni. Press, 1942.

Mahan, A. T., *The Influence of Sea Power upon history 1660-1783*, 11th Ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1918.

Petzina, Dietmar, Werner Abelshauser, and Anselm Faust (eds), *Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, Materialien zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 1914-1945*, Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1978, Vol. III.

Rajab, Omar Al- Farouk, Power of the State: Geostrategic Studies, Cairo, Madbouli Library, 1992.

Ratzel, Friedrich, Politische Geographie, München und Leipzig, VDerlag von Oldenbourg, 1897.

Raffael, Scheck, Germany, 1871–1945 A Concise History, Oxford, 1st Floor, 2008.

Robertson, E. M., Hitler's Pre- War Policy and Military Plans 1933- 1939, London, Longmans, 1963.

Roper, Hugh Trevor (Ed.), Hitler's Secret Conversations 1941- 1943, New York, The New American library, 1961.

Spang, Christian W., Karl Haushofer und Japan: Die Rezeption seiner geopolitischen Theorien in der Deutschen und Japanischen Politik [Karl Haushofer and Japan: The Reception of his Geopolitical Theories in German and Japanese Politics], Munich: Ludicium, Berlin, Hartmut Walravens, 2013.

Spang, Christian W., Karl Haushofer re-examined: Geopolitics factor of Japanese-German rapprochement in the inter-war years.

Research in Arabic

Abdel-Al, Hassan, "Israeli Geopolitics: The Entrance to the Israeli War Geopolitics", *Political Thought Magazine*, No. 13-14, 2001. (A. T.)

Earl, "The Nazi Idea of War", in: Edward Med Earl and others. , *The Pioneers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to Hitler*, trans. Mohamed Abdel Fattah Ibrahim, Cairo, Alnahdh Almasryah Library, D. T. (A. T.)

Mohammed, Salah Al-Amin Abdullah, "The German Barbarians and their Role in the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West in 476 AD", *Journal of Science and Human Studies (Al-Marj)*, Electronic Scientific Journal, Vol. I, Vol. II, 2014. (A. T.)

Mohamed, Sabah Mahmood, "The Idea of the Living Space: Land Expansion in Nazi and Zionist Thought and Practice", *Afaq Earabiat*, Third Year, Issue 1, March 1978. (A. T.)

Snow, Abdul Raouf, "German Nationalism and its Manifestations of Unity, Racism and Imperialism, 1806-1990", in: Burhan Ghalioun and others, *Arabism and the 21st Century*, Beirut, Future Movement, 2009, p. 99. (A. T.)

Whittlesey, Derwent, "Haushofer: The Geopoliticians Scientists of the Earth

Policy”, *The Pioneers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to Hitler* ed. Edward Mead Earl and others. , trans. Mohamed Abdel Fattah Ibrahim, Alnahdh Almasryah Library, Cairo, p. 29.

Research in English and German

Ayscough, Florence, “Japan und die Japaner by Karl Haushofer”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, No. 3, (1924).

Barnes, Trevor J. and Christian Abrahamsson, “Tangled complicities and moral struggles: the Haushofers, father and son, and the spaces of Nazi geopolitics”, *Journal of Historical Geography*, No. 47, (2015).

Bel, Germa, “Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany”, *Economic History Review* (2009).

Correa, Romar, “Hitler’s Money: The Bills of Exchange of Schacht and Rearmament in the Third Reich”, *American Review of Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2002), pp. p. 17-18.

Costachie, Silviu and Nicolae Damian, “Ratzel and the German Geopolitical School - the Inception of Culture as an Essential Element and Factor in the Political Geography”, *Revista Română de Geografie Politică Year XII*, No. 2, (2010), pp. p. 307-308.

Diner, Dan, “Grundbuch des Planeten: Zur Geopolitik Karl Haushofers”, (Land Registry of the Planet: On the Geopolitics of Karl Haushofer), *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 32. Jahrg., 1. H., (1984).

Heffernan, Michael, “Fin De Siecle, Fin Du Monde? On the Origins of European Geopolitics, 1890–1920”, in: Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (Ed.), *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*, London, Routledge, 2000.

Hetzel, Robert L., “German Monetary History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century”, *Economic Quarterly (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond)*, Volume 88, No. 1, (2002).

Lasker, Bruno, “Japan Und Die Japaner Karl Haushofer”, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 6, (1933), pp. p. 319-320.

Lüdecke, Cornelia, “Carl Ritters (1779-1859) Einfluß auf die Geographie bis hin zur Geopolitik Karl Haushofers (1869-1946)” (Carl Ritters (1779-1859) Influence Geography up to the Geopolitics of Karl Haushofer), *Sudhoffs Archiv*, Bd. 88, H. 2, 2004.

Mackinder, H. J., "The Geographical Pivot of History", *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, No. 4, (1904).

Mukerji, K. P., "The Emergence of Geopolitics (in the inter-war period)", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 4, October—December, 1948.

Murice, Williams, "German Imperialism and Austria 1938", in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 14, 1979.

Ritschl, A. O., "Nazi Economic Imperialism and the Exploitation of the Small: Evidence from Germany's Secret Foreign Exchange Balances, 1938-1940", *Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 54, No. 2, (2001).

Schnitzer, Ewald W., "German Geopolitics Revived", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 3, (1955), p. 408.

Schöller, Peter, "Die Rolle Karl Haushofers für Entwicklung und Ideologie Nationalsozialistischer Geopolitik", (Karl Haushofer's Role in the Development and Ideology of National Socialist Geopolitics), *Erdkunde*, Bd. 36, H. 3, (1982).

Sprout, Margreit Tittl, "Mahan: Missionary for Maritime Power", in: Edward Med Earl and others. , *The Pioneers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to Hitler*, trans. Mohamed Abdel Fattah Ibrahim, Cairo, Alnahdh Almasryah Library.

Turner, Henry A., Jr., "Hitler's Secret Pamphlet for Industrialists", *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 40, No. 3, (1968).

Academic Dissertations

Madllum, Aziz Abdulla, *Bismarck's Diplomatic Policy and Competition Towards the German Colonies in Africa*, Unpublished Ph. D Dissertation, University of St. Clements, Political Science, 2011.

Al-Sultani, Haidar Shaker, *Anti-Semitism in Nazi Thought and Practice 1920-1945*, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Baghdad University / Faculty of Arts, 2010.

